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The ever increasing attention being paid to finance capital and the financializationi process 
itself has rendered the old fashioned monetary policy apparently in effective in accomplishing 
celebrated twin objectives of containing inflation and fueling economic growth. It is becoming 
evident that the growth of financial institutions which have not been directly regulated by the 
Central Banks as in the case of orthodox financial intermediaries, has in fact rendered the 
weapons of monetary policy almost inoperative, and therefore, it appears that central banks all 
over the world, especially in developing countries like India, have confined themselves into the 
role of ‘measuring’ inflation and taking steps to ease inflationary pressured by the way of 
putting certain ‘classical restrains’ on the lending rate of formal financial institutions over 
which Central Banks still have the regulatory mandates. To validate this, for instance, let us 
recall the euphoria that were created in the air by the present incumbent at the RBI, 
Dr.Reghuram Rajanii, when he wore the suite of RBI Governor quitting his assignments at the 
IMF, that he would appoint Committees after committees to look into domains of present 
monetary policy framework, and adopt policies triggering economic growth. The expectation 
was that he would deviate from the ‘mistakes’ which his predecessors had made, and introduce 
policies that would help the economy to take a new route of growth by way of reducing the 
cost of money, and thereby encouraging the real sector to invest, and create more gainful 
employment opportunities. But two years down the line, Reghuram Rajan’s tall promises still 
remain unfulfilled, and it is astonishing that he seems to have put his feet in the same shoes of 
his predecessors; increasing regulatory rate of interest point wise claiming that inflation would 
have to be tamed. Thus it is obvious that Central Banks in most of the developing economies 
especially in countries like India have become the mere institutional arrangements to manage 
currency issues so that inflation is not accelerated to derail the system, heeding nothing to the 
growth and development imperatives of the country. In the background of these developments, 
the present work intends to examine the contours of monetary policy in India and while 
examining the turnaround in monetary policy the paper also attempts to look into whether the 
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policies have given effect to the real economic intentions of the government viz. augmenting 
employment, income and stabilizing the price level, and to suggest ways of adapting monetary 
policy to the real economic requirements of the country. 
What is expected of MP theoretically? 
Before dwelling into the various aspects of present monetary policy in India, it is important to 
have a theoretical insight into the significance of monetary policy as a macroeconomic tooliii. 
It has been well understood that Inflation is always a monetary phenomenon at least in 
developed nations (Friendman, 1956). Now, theoretically speaking, MP forms an important 
arm of economic policies of any type of government. The strength, spirit and the relevance of 
MP actually emanates from the undisputable role that money plays in an exchange economy. 
Every economy is compartmentalized into: the real sector and the monetary sector. A 
decoupling of these two vital segments of an exchange economy eventually collapses the 
system, and that is why, taking note of this, many well established economists have called for 
the proper and effective integration of the real and the monetary sector. The Classical writers, 
while believing in full employments, found monetary policy as neutral in its influence on real 
variables, and argued that changes in the stock of money could only decide the direction of the 
general price level leaving real variables unaffected. Contrary to this view, Keynesian on the 
other hand stood with the argument that such neutrality of money becomes operational only 
once the economy is put into the situation of full employment, and so long as the country is 
ravaged under the problem of unemployment of productive resources, monetary policy could 
be used to impact real economic variables viz. output and employment. For long, the entire 
discussion on the role of monetary policy in influencing real economic variables has centered 
on these two paradigms which are poles apart in their approaches.  
In this context it is quite imperative to look into the expected role of monetary policy in 
countries like India which has been saddened with the problem of unemployment and poverty 
for a long period of time. In India too official appointees of Central Banks have always had the 
view that taming inflation within the affordable limit ought to be the primary objective of 
monetary policy although governments especially finance ministers have always been 
demanding monetary policy to be pro active in tackling real economic issues. Such has been 
the gravest and perhaps the toughest stand the highest officers of Central Banks used to take 
that in some occasions even the governors of RBI expressed their willingness to step down 
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from the post of Governor if Central Government continued the policy of pressuring them to 
fall in line with dictates of Central Government as far as the monetary policy is concernediv.  
What might have pursued Central Bank to curiously and vigorously focus on controlling money 
stock to stabilize the price level without heeding to the real economic requirements of the 
nation? One reason, perhaps, had been the influence of foreign exchange reserves on the high 
powered money stock of our country. During the regulated regime of the forex market, there 
could be compelling circumstances when the fluctuations in the forex reserves owing to volatile 
Balance of Payments (BoP) exerted unwelcoming pressures on the reserve money stock of the 
country. To counter this, like any central bank of countries running a regulated exchange rate 
and a market, the RBI as well would have to resort to ‘sterilization’ techniques to free the 
domestic money supply of external disturbances. Barring this technically undeniable factor, 
another factor that might have been at work is the perpetual policy of Government to run fiscal 
deficit and its repercussions on the money supply of the country which needs to be looked into 
in detail.  
The villainous role of Budget and the entry of Monetary Targeting 
Having said all that Central Bank should look beyond merely monitoring the rate of growth of 
money supply in a country like India, one must be contended with the fact that uncontrolled 
monetary expansion in the pursuit of rejuvenating the real sector by injecting liquidity may 
create and exacerbate severe instabilities in the monetary system, resulting in the eventual 
derailment of the economy. We have experiences of countries facing complete inexplicable 
financial anarchy like Iraq where people used to move to market with basket of money only to 
return home with pocket of goods when galloping inflation crept into that nation following the 
invasion of US led western troops. Even now, before us, there is the Sudan money market, 
where money has eventually become just papers devoid of commensurate value. Undoubtedly, 
one cannot expect such things to happen in a developing country like India.  
Knowing these things that once things get out of control it is difficult to bring back financial 
normalcy, Central Bank in India has been very cautious in dealing with issues pertaining to 
money supply. But certain factors external to Central Bank like the fiscal deficit that creeps 
into the budget of the central government has appeared to be an influencing determinant of 
money supply in India. Several steps to reduce fiscal deficit aside, still the problem persists 
unabated thanks to the failure on the part of the central government to mobilize revenue both 
direct and indirect, and to axe the unproductive expenditure of the government. The fiscal 
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deficit unless bridged by the government borrowing would lead to minting additional currency, 
that is increasing the High Powered Money (Gupta, 2010), and when it is put to the system, 
multiplied via credit creation process, would further trigger of growth in broad measure of 
money supply, which is labeled as M3v. In fact this fear had ruled the monetary policy makers 
in India for quite some time, and of course, one cannot find fault with them in assessing the 
impact of high fiscal deficit in that way. It was with the intention of diluting the pressure of 
fiscal agencies on the determination of money supply in India that a committee headed by 
Prof.Sukhmoy Chakravarty, later came to be known as the Chakravarty Committee, was 
appointed to look into all gimmicks of this unholy tie up between the fiscal deficit and high 
powered money growth. This committee, after having gone into the details of this mechanism, 
had made a historic recommendation in the monetary history of the country that a target rate of 
growth of money expansion needed to be set up after consultation between the RBI and the 
GOI which would bind both organizations in a common effort of containing the rate of growth 
of money supply in India. This entire process of fixing the target rate of growth of M3 has later 
come to be known as the ‘Monetary Targeting’ (MT, hereafter). To put in other words, the MT 
was one of the first step to free the Central Bank and the money supply from the unnecessary 
exertion of the fiscal deficit, or it could be well said that MT broke the connection between the 
fiscal deficit and the money supply partially putting an end to the coercion that GOI could place 
on the RBI.  
 
Had excess money supply due to high but manageable fiscal deficit been problematic for the 
Indian economy? Well, an answer to this question requires much analytical exercise. But 
viewing from straightforward commonsensical stand, the plain picture before us might compel 
us to argue that during the time till the MT came to the picture at least, the money supply had 
not put any pressure on India’s growth and development. During this testing time in the post 
independent India, she had made path breaking accomplishments building many temples of 
heavy industrialization, the benefits of which we are reaping today. Although growth had not 
been that much crazy during this period, development did take place which undoubtedly drove 
the economy to high growth path in the later period including the post liberalization period. It 
needs to be noted here that during this period, the impact on price level could be absorbed to a 
greater extent without badly affecting the real income of the people.  
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Several studies analyze the nexus between deficit and inflation. The course of nexus can be of 
two types:  Deficit induced inflation and Inflation induced deficit (Rangarajan & Mohanty, 
1998). Boost in money growth may be the outcome of high fiscal deficit. On the other hand, 
the existence of high inflation could also lead to high fiscal deficit thanks to the high cost 
economy. Generally it has been documented that high fiscal deficit is detrimental to the 
economic growth. This is primarily due to the fact that fiscal deficit is financed by money 
supply creation having untoward effect on the growth prospects of the economy in future. But 
if fiscal deficit is the result of investment by the government on productive sectors, in the long 
run, through supply side effect, fiscal deficit can turn out to be a blessing for the nation. 
However, it needs to be noted that fiscal deficit in pre-reform period did not reduce GDP as 
much as it happened in the post-reform period. For instance, a study obvious shows that one 
percent increase in FD reduced GDP by .41 percent in the reform period of 1992-2011 whereas 
it did reduce GDP only .014 percent in the pre-reform period 1970-1991 (Monhanty, 2014). 
Moving further data reveal that fiscal deficit, measured as GFD/GDP ratio and WPI inflation, 
have not exhibited any noticeable relation in India both in the reform and pre-reform period, 
whereas fiscal deficit and money growth have (Figure No.2).  
Figure 2 Fiscal Deficits, Money Growth and Inflation 
 
        Source: RBI publications 
The External Effect and BOP Crisis  
One bad consequence of persistent fiscal deficit and its repercussions on the quantum of 
domestic money supply was felt on the external part of the economy in the form of spiraling 
prices of exports, making India’s trade competitiveness poor relative to other similar nations. 
The escalating import bill coupled with plummeting export earnings wiped out India’s foreign 
exchange reserves which worsened the BOP position. This severe BOP crisis was the 
impending reason which forced the country to knock the doors of IMF and World Bank for 
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conditional or tied aids. Following the prescriptions of these donor institutions at the behest of 
the US led group, India had to abide by the policy of keeping fiscal deficit low, and FRBMvi 
act had to be passed to make low fiscal deficit mandatory. Thanks to all these steps, today 
Central Bank of the country has been in a safe position as it has been relieved of the pressures 
of GOI’s fiscal deficit in determining the quantum of Hvii money to be issued. This in fact has 
become a blessing in disguise for the RBI as there has been voice in the air in favor of allowing 
autonomy for the RBI. The relief from GOI fiscal deficit at least partially can be reckoned as a 
practical step towards the autonomy of the CB.  
Now, we have a CB free of policy intervention from the part of GOI to a greater extent; a CB 
to decide only on the money supply growth. The question now is: Does CB appears to be so 
essential to decide only the cost of money, and thereby taking decision pertaining to the rate of 
growth of money supply. The way of functioning of CB for quite some time tempt not to 
disbelief that CB has deviated from its objective of accomplishing certain growth parameters. 
A cut in interest rate can do wonders unless liquidity trap operates and the operation of liquidity 
trap itself is a remote possibility. But, our CB has been reluctant to run a cut in policy interest 
rate so as to give a right signal to the real sector to boost its investment. The seemingly 
unjustifiable reluctance on the part of the CB in executing a slash in policy interest rates so as 
to rejuvenate the real sector has cost the economy a lot.  
As a corollary to this, one must understand the fact that in India inflation has unequivocally 
been regarded as a structural catastrophe rather than a demand induced one. Despite many 
studies stressing the structural nature of inflation, the policy makers have been giving deaf ear 
to this, and they appear to have been treating inflation as demand side problem and suggesting 
much tried out monetary solutions. Theoretically, inflation is demand side tragedy in so called 
full employed western countries, whereas in countries like India it continues to be supply side, 
more emphatically, a structural one. Hence, it is not understandable why RBI has been stressing 
more on controlling liquidity in the name of taming inflation without facilitating the 
implementation of strategies (using longsighted supply side solutions) to arrest inflation.   
The MSP role in inflation 
Studies have shown that inflation in India has hardly been influenced by the CB’s policy 
variables; rather, it has well been proved through econometric models that inflation has been 
set and reset in accordance with the announcement of Minimum Support Price (MSP) which is 
of course has been a political maneuvering in a country like India. Obviously, it has been 
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revealed that changes in MSP is key to explain around 5 percent variance in CPI inflation in 
India, and perhaps on account of this that inflation in India has sarcastically been called MSP 
inflation (Bhalla, 2014). That is inflation of today could be explained by the MSP announced 
in the previous year, which underlines the much held position that inflation in India has been a 
structural one, or more obviously, a politically motivated thing. Moving further it is obvious 
that inflation in India has not been much caused by changes in money supply. Most interesting 
thing is that such a trend is visible in the reform period too. A glance at the figure provided 
below stands testimony to this (Figure No.2).  
Figure 2 Broad Money and Inflation Rate 
 
 Source: RBI publications 
Concluding Observations 
The foregoing discussion on the monetary policy of the RBI in the context of the 
macroeconomic environment clearly emphasizes the need to reorient the monetary policy to 
materialize the real economic objectives of the country. The time has ripened enough to change 
the course of action of RBI with regard to the implementation of monetary policy tools. What 
the regulator requires is a package of policies in line with the strategies of government to take 
the economy to a new track of growth. Short term monetary tools can no longer be considered 
as a permanent solution to address the problem of inflation. What we really require is supply 
side adjustments smoothed by monetary policy support. Money should oil the system, stimulate 
the economy, and finally it should stabilize the economy as well. Since the Indian economy 
has been witnessing the emergence of specialized banking and non-banking financial 
intermediaries, the role of RBI itself has become more complicated. It calls for segregating the 


















End Notes  
i  Financialization connotes a situation where social relations are increasingly expressed in 
terms of money. Or in other words a situation where every exchange is made with the 
medium of financial device. 
ii Mr.Rajan, who assumed office of the Governor of RBI amidst the crisis increased the repo 
rate by 25 basis points or 25 percent to 7.50 percent surprising the business community in 
India 
iii However, we do not intend to give a complete theoretical outline of the monetary policy 
which any standard book on monetary economics would do. 
iv I G Patel in his book on his role as an economist in various positions referred to such 
occasions. 
v M3 is considered as the broad measure of money supply in India which inter alia comprises 
of currency, demand liabilities, fixed liabilities and post office savings. 
vi FRBM stands for Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, a legislative initiative 
to bring in fiscal discipline, and thereby to reduce fiscal deficit 
vii H money refers to High Powered Money which is acting as the monetary base. 
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